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Abstract. This article provides commentary on the appropriateness of deporting illegal aliens in support
of homeland security policy.
One post-9/11 homeland security initiative in the United States (US) has comprised various governmentsponsored actions taken against illegal aliens. Illegal aliens have been incarcerated often without public
notification and without access to a lawyer or family, placed under close observation by law
enforcement authorities, deported, or directly or indirectly induced to leave the country. A prime focus
on this initiative bears on Arab and Muslim illegal aliens, deportation, and the associated rightness or
wrongness of the implemented policy.
The most common public discourse on deportation as homeland security policy has centered on the
appropriateness of constraining the freedom of illegal aliens to live where and how they wish to live.
And for opponents of deportation, this constraint is ipso facto wrong. Is it?
In a legal context, one can easily enough spot anything from Constitutional language to legal precedents
supporting the necessity of a trade-off between a constraint on freedom and individual and collective
security. One might make the wrong call on how one decides what this trade-off should be in a specific
situation, but one has strong legal foundation in attempting to make it.
In an ethical context, a security policymaker can assert that constraining freedom is necessary to best
discharge the responsibility of developing and supporting individual and collective security. The validity
of this assertion is dependent on various epistemologies—e.g., faith, authority, reason and logic,
empiricism—but with intentional and consequential validity comes support for an ethical foundation of
constraining freedom in the service of security.
In a moral context, one might be confronted with the comparative rightness and wrongness of
constraining freedom versus individual and collective security as a guidon in living a life of the Good. As
with the ethical context, the moral context confronts an epistemological challenge—but not a
perspective that can be rejected out of hand.
Now, beyond the stance of the ipso facto wrongness of constraining freedom is a more sophisticated
stance that relates to differential constraining of freedom. For example, not all illegal residents are
being treated similarly. Some groups of ethnic variables are seemingly interpreted as less threatening
than those identified as constituting Arab and Muslim identity—with the latter presumed to warrant a
more significant constraint of freedom.
For a differential constraining of freedom to be warranted, one would somehow have to demonstrate
how an interpretation of greater threat attributed to a group; of ethnic variables is warranted. This
demonstration can be attempted in at least two ways. First, terrorist behaviors such as killing and
injuring people, destroying and damaging material infrastructure, or threatening to engage in such
action might be demonstrated to be more likely in one ethnic group than another or others. Second, an
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ethnic group might be demonstrated to be more likely to wittingly or unwittingly engage in activities
supporting terrorist behaviors—from providing safe houses to being less likely to provide potentially
helpful information about their ethnic peers to counterterrorist authorities.
However, even if one could demonstrate statistically significant linkages, a differential constraining of
freedom might still not be appropriate because of the likelihood of a false positive rate of huge
dimensions for the ethnic group identified as more likely to present a threat. In other words, more
individuals from one ethnic group than another—per capita or in an absolute sense—may be more likely
to engage in terrorism or supporting it, but the vast majority of this group will not. In fact, the
stigmatization and associated programs supporting a counterterrorist policy based on statistically
significant differences between groups can render an ethnic group even more threatening, because
there’s now even more in the real world that can elicit direct or indirect terrorist behavior. In essence, a
self-fulfilling prophecy can be created that might reflect favorably on the counterterrorist expert but not
on national security.
So operating homeland security policy based on differential constraints of freedom might increase the
security problem as much as it might help it through disruption of active and passive terrorist planning.
On the other hand, just letting all illegal aliens remain in the US would admirably avoid increasing a
security problem within an ethnic group, but would allow active and passive terrorists to work their evil
and even attract additional terrorists through their perception of an easier operational and planning
environment. As well, the potentially huge lethality of a terrorist attack might not allow the
implementation of such a policy.
The best homeland security policy must be based on better intelligence. This would involve upgrades in
the collection of more relevant and accurate information, the analysis of that information, and the
timely and secure transmission of that information to policymakers and other security authorities.
Constraints of freedom would then be more appropriately targeted and might or might not target an
ethnic group during interludes of a dynamic, ever-changing security world.
Given that the political world is ineluctably characterized as a constraint of freedom, public discourse on
homeland security should not focus on the presence of constraints but on how it can be most judiciously
employed. This is a tougher question, one that is not as easily associated with expressions of selfrighteousness and moral indignation but one that just might better support homeland security against
terrorist foes. (See Arquilla, J., & Karasik, T. (1999). Chechnya: A glimpse of future conflict? [Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 22, 207-229; Horton, A. (2002). Violent crimes and racial profiling: What the
evidence suggests. Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 6, 87-106; Macias, J. (2002).
The tragedy of terrorism: Perspective, reflection, and action in the aftermath. Anthropology & Education
Quarterly, 33, 280-282; Ward, J.D. (2002). Race, ethnicity, and law enforcement profiling: Implications
for public policy. Public Administration Review, 62, 726-735.) (Keywords: Deportation, Ethnic Profiling,
Homeland Security)
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